Culture, Regional Expertise and Language Management Office

C R E L M O

Dr. Mahir J. Ibrahimov

29 September 2016

Future of Eurasia:

Cultural Perspectives, Geopolitics and Energy Security

Culture, Regional Expertise and Language Management Office (CRELMO) jointly with the Missouri University of Science and Technology (MS&T)-Rolla, Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

DATE: Thursday, September 29, 2016 **TIME:** 13:30 –15:30 CST
LOCATION: Arnold Conference Room, Lewis & Clark Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS
For more information contact the CRELMO Program Manager at 913-684-3345 *or*
http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/lrec

SENIOR LEADER KEYNOTE ADDRESS:

Col. Greg Penfield - Vice Provost for Learning Systems, Army University

GUEST SPEAKERS:

Dr. Tseggai Isaac - Associate Professor, Department of History and Political Science, the Missouri University of Science and Technology (MS&T) - Rolla
Dr. Christopher Marsh - Professor, U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), CGSC Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Mr. Robert W. Kurz - Intelligence Analyst/Researcher, Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), TRADOC

MODERATOR:

Dr. Mahir J. Ibrahimov - Program Manager, Culture, Regional Expertise/ language Management Office (CRELMO), TRADOC/CAC/ArmyU, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Commonwealth of Independent States

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

World Bank, "GDP growth (annual %)," World Development Indicators, accessed 12 September 2016 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?Code=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&id=af3ce82b&report_name=Popular_indicators&populartype=series&ispopular=y#

Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

The 9K720 Iskander-M

Known in NATO as the SS-26 Stone—is a short-range ballistic missile. While export versions of the missile have a range of 280 kilometers and payload of 480Kg, the weapons destined for domestic service have a range 500 kilometers. Would certainly have a range to strike the Redzikowo missile defense facility in Poland, which is a bit more than 200 km from Kaliningrad.

Source: Global Security Org..
http://www.globalsecurity.org/jhtml/jframe.html#http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/images/ss-26-kaliningr

Oil and Gas Pipeline Politics

SOURCES: RIA NOVOSTI, AEI

Russian Army chief of the General Staff General V. “Gerasimov Doctrine” or is it really a Doctrine?

- Russia is engaged in a civilizational as well as geopolitical struggle with the West in a continual state of conflict. It’s the war of ideas and values using the asymmetrical operations without the formal declaration of war.

- Special forces operating jointly with internal opposition leveraging information operations, cyber, legal, electronic and economic warfare to achieve its strategic outcome.

”Tsenosti Nauki V Predvidenii. Novie Vizovi Trebuyut Pereosmislit Formi I Sposobi Vedenia Boyevikh Deistviy,” ”At The Foresight Of The Value of Science : New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations,“ Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier online, 27 February 2013, issue #8(476), accessed 16 September 2016, http://vpk-news.ru/articles/14632.

OBSERVATIONS FROM UKRAINE:
Ukraine's Hidden Battlefield

Rob W. Kurz

Foreign Military Studies Office
Open Source - Foreign Perspectives - Understudied Topics
www.leavenworth.fmso.army.mil

OBSERVATIONS FROM UKRAINE:

Ukraine’s Hidden Battlefield

Background of Trip

Brief Background of Conflict in Ukraine

Ukrainian Perspectives

Key Observations – *a one-week snapshot*

OBSERVATIONS FROM UKRAINE:
Ukraine’s Hidden Battlefield

Ukrainian Perspectives

The Prevalence of Russian Propaganda

Cultural Invasion
Historical Distortion
Centralized Media
Information and Psychological Operations

Russian General-Lieutenant Kartapalov

Early 2015: Published article in Russia's *Bulletin of the Academy of Military Science;* examined changes in the nature of armed struggle and what is described as "new-type" war.

Then-Chief of the Main Operations Directorate, General Staff of Russia

Late 2015: Named as head of Western Military District

Ukraine observations frequently fell within these two categories


Methods and Ways of Conducting a New-Type of War
Achieving Goals in New-Type Warfare in Combination with the Employment of Military Force or without it.
Set of Indirect Actions ("Hybrid Methods")
Pressuring the Enemy Politically, Economically, Informationally, and Psychologically
Disorienting the Political and Military Leadership of the State-Victim. Spreading Dissatisfaction among the Population
Preparing Armed Opposition Detachments and Sending Them to the Conflict Region
Intensifying Diplomatic Pressure and Propaganda to the World Community
Covertly Deploying and Employing Special Operations Forces, Cyber Attacks and Software Effects, Conducting Reconnaissance and Subversive Acts on a Large Scale, Supporting the Internal Opposition, and Employing New Weapon Systems
Shifting to Classical Methods of Waging War, Using Various Types of Weapons
in Combination with Large-Scale Information Effects
Seizing Enemy Territory with the Simultaneous Action against (destruction of) Forces and Targets to the Entire Depth of His Territory
Employing Precision Weapons on a Large Scale, Extensively Using Special Operations Forces, Robotic Complexes, and Weapons Based on NPP
Liquidating Centers of Resistance with the Help of Artillery and Air Strikes, Delivering Precision Weapons Strikes, and Landing of Assault Forces. Clearing Out the Territory using Ground Forces.
Establishing Full Control over the State-Victim.

OBSERVATIONS FROM UKRAINE:
Ukraine's Hidden Battlefield

Ukrainian Perspectives

Russian Presence / Influence in Critical Ukrainian Sectors

News Industry – *GRU, Reflexive Control*

Radio Stations – *Seamless transitions*

Cyber – *Influence Measures or Shut-downs*

Ukrainian Orthodox Church - *Division*

OBSERVATIONS FROM UKRAINE:
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Ukrainian Perspectives

Russian Presence / Influence in Critical Ukrainian Sectors

DEFENSE:

On the Front Line

In the Commanders' Staffs

International Entities: OSCE, JCC

OBSERVATIONS FROM UKRAINE:
Ukraine's Hidden Battlefield

KEY OBSERVATIONS

One-week Snapshot…

Enduring Undercurrent of Russian Influence

Russia has the Initiative

Russia is using Indirect Methods ("New-Type")

- **Masters of Propaganda / Strategic Communications**
- **Own Capability to Escalate or De-escalate**
- **Penetrating / Influencing / Manipulating Ukraine's Key Sectors**
- **Intelligence / Influence is Integrated and Ubiquitous**
- **Impact on Ukrainian Military at All Levels**

…A hidden battlefield, extending to nearly every feature on Ukraine's map.

Russian Public Opinion on NATO, War, and Other Events

Dr. Christopher Marsh, SAMS

Resetting US-Russia Relations

- Obama Administration and Attempt to “Reset” US-Russia Relations
- Let’s not “overcharge” each other!
- What are we resetting?
- Overall, a complete failure

US Engagement of the "New" Russia

- Attempt to facilitate rapid political and economic reform
- Seen a "foreign agents" involving ourselves in their business
- Some successes, some failures, some disenchantment
- Who is to blame?

Russian Views on World Affairs

caption: “How the Americans control the territory of Russia.”

Domestic Context to Russian Foreign Policy

Protest and Popular Unrest

- Despite the increased wealth in Russia, average Russians suffer
- Economic sanctions have hit average Russians hard
- anti-Putin movement appears almost gone, infrequent protests
- For many Russians, life still a struggle; so why the transition?

NATO Expansion



Russian Views on World Affairs: NATO Expansion

- Expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe in 1999
- Baltics join in 2004
- Question of admission of Ukraine and Georgia

NATO Expansion – Ukraine and Georgia, 2008

Q4a. How big a threat would Ukraine's joining NATO represent to the security of Russia?



Q4b. How big a threat would Georgia's joining NATO represent to the security of Russia?



Source: Levada Center, nationwide survey, 12-15 September 2008, N=1,597

Russian Views on World Affairs: Friends and Enemies

COULD RUSSIA SEE IN THE COMING YEAR... ***(year in question indicated)***

	Definitely yes	Probably yes	Probably no	Definitely no	It is difficult to say
... armed conflict with neighboring countries?					
2016	**4**	**25**	**34**	**16**	**21**
2015	6	21	39	19	15
2014	2	18	44	15	20
2013	3	21	40	18	18
...war with USA/NATO?					
2016	**2**	**11**	**40**	**27**	**21**
2015	5	11	41	27	16

Likelihood of domestic violence

COULD RUSSIA SEE IN THE COMING YEAR... ***(year in question indicated)***

	Definitely yes	Probably yes	Probably no	Definitely no	It is difficult to say
...exacerbation of the Northern Caucasus situation?					
2016	**5**	**23**	**37**	**12**	**24**
2015	7	22	38	13	20
2014	6	36	30	5	23
2013	5	35	30	9	22
...mass ethnic conflicts?					
2016	**4**	**26**	**38**	**17**	**15**
2015	4	26	41	15	13
2014	6	42	30	6	15

Views on Crimea

DO YOU SUPPORT THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA BY RUSSIA?*

	2014*					2015								
	III	V	X	XI	XII	I	II	III	IV	V	VII	VIII	IX	**XI**
Definitely yes	57	54	55	53	50	50	52	55	55	56	51	50	54	**48**
Probably yes	31	36	31	31	36	34	32	33	34	29	33	33	30	**35**
Probably no	6	4	7	6	7	8	9	6	6	7	8	10	9	**11**
Definitely no	1	1	2	5	3	4	3	2	2	2	3	2	3	**3**
It is difficult to say	4	5	5	6	4	4	4	4	4	6	4	5	4	**3**

* - In March and May this question was given in the following formula: "Are you personally for or against the annexation of Crimea by Russia?"

- Consistently strong support for the annexation of Crimea: definitely yes + probably yes = greater than 80% consistently
- Very little opposition to annexation

Threats and Enemies

- Biggest threats:
- domestic, ethnic conflict erupting (30%) and the North Caucasus flaring up again (28%)
- War with a neighboring country just as strong; 29%
- But war with NATO/US seen as low (13%)

Views on Annexation of Crimea

HAS THE ANNEXATION OF CRIMEA, IN YOUR OPINION, DONE RUSSIA MORE GOOD OR MORE HARM?

	Mar.15	Aug.15	**Nov.15**
More good	70	59	**59**
More harm	18	23	**22**
It is difficult to say	12	18	**18**

HOW WOULD YOU EVALUATE THE CURRENT SITUATION IN EASTERN UKRAINE?

	Oct.15	**Nov.15**
Good	1	**4**
Calm	11	**11**
Tense	64	**60**
Critical, volatile	15	**19**
It is difficult to say	9	**7**

- Slight decline in number of those who see annexation of Crimea a good thing (drop from 70% to 59% throughout 2015
- Majority (60%) see situation in eastern Ukraine as “tense”

Relations with Ukraine?

In your opinion, how should Russia construct relations with Ukraine? (closed-ended question, one answer, %)		
	2005	2016
Like with any other country of the world – avoiding any conflicts, not making concessions	54	45
Striving for special friendly relations with the current leadership	19	12
Pressing for coming to power those Ukrainian political forces that support Russia	16	29
Don't know	11	14

- But we see an increase in those who want to see pro-Russian forces coming to power in Ukraine, and that Russia should take an active role in that (increased from 16% to 29% over the past decade

Areas of Concern for Russian Citizens

Which Events In The Last Four Weeks Have Been The Most Memorable For You?

	Jul.16
Campaign to ban Russian athletes from the Olympics / doping scandals	30
Military action/fight with terrorism in Syria	14
UK referendum on leaving the EU on June 23	7
Extension of anti-Russian EU sanctions	5
Increased tensions, conflicts in Donbas	4
Decision to deploy NATO troops in Poland and the Baltics	3
Vladimir Putin's visit to China	3
Warsaw NATO summit	2
NATO-Russia Council meeting	1

- Olympics scandal the biggest deal; decision to deploy NATO forces in Poland and Baltics barely registers (3%)
- War in Syria much more of a concern to average Russian (14%)

Russian Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

- What does this tell us about Russian foreign policy?
- Putin has a pretty free hand to do as he wishes in the international realm
- His vision of geopolitics either resonates with the population (through state-controlled media outlets) or they just don’t care/have other priorities
- This is not unique to Russia – in many parts of the world (especially non-democracies) average citizens have low awareness/interest in foreign affairs

NATO | OTAN

Cultural Studies in the Army

The Global Front within the Context of Homefront

Introductory Remarks

Dr. Tseggai Isaac
Associate Professor
Department of History and Political Science
the Missouri University of Science and Technology (MS&T) -Rolla

Defining Culture

- Expression of Individual and National Character; the Expressive Psychological Attributes that Identify the Values, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Norms of Societies
  - **Values** – Cherished Sentiments
  - **Beliefs** – Embraced Faiths
  - **Attitudes** – Expressions of Values and Beliefs
  - **Norms** – Entrenched Values, Beliefs, and Attitudes

The Universal Context of Cultures

- The Human Quest
  - The Principles of Natural Rights - Indivisible
  - The Challenges of Objectivity - Rationality
  - Inalienability as a Context – The Principles of Equality
  - Pitfalls of Subjectivity – Short selling Objectivity

Attributes of Cultures

- Orthodox Cultures
  - Tradition-bound
  - Fettered to Scriptures, To Symbols, To Founders
  - Dogmatic – Averse to Evolutions, Vulnerable to Revolutions
  - Postpone Inevitable Crippling Revolutions
- Example of Orthodox Cultures
  - Islam in the State – Political Islam
  - Totalitarianism
  - Personality Cult Regimes

The Three World Cultures: the Challenge

- The Eurasian and Middle East Cultures
- Eurasia
  - The Post-Soviet Cultural Dilemma
  - The European Pull
  - The Islamic Push
  - The Quest for Redemptive Freedoms
  - The Challenges of Daring Cultural Outreach
    - The Undeniable Universality of Freedom, Liberty, Justice
  - Challenging the Enslaving Outreaches of Russian Totalitarianism
  - Crafting Effective tools of Soft, but Disciplined Power

The Three World Cultures (Cont'd)

- Middle East
- The Four Centers of Islamic Cultures
- Egypt's Circular Journeys to Governance
  - The Quest for Democratization
  - The Decaying Intermediations of Authoritarianism
  - The Promises of the Impossible Islamism
  - Back to Decaying Intermediation of Authoritarianism

- Turkey's Democracy
  - A Front or Genuine Democracy?
  - Is there "Secular Islam" in Erdogan's Vocabularies?
- Iran – The Impossible Islamic State Without Persian Heritage
- Saudi Arabia – The Abode of Islam

The Three World Cultures (Cont'd)

- Africa – Amenable for Molding Culture of Liberty
- The Challenges of African Poverty
- The Challenges of Western Undervaluation
- Chinese Opportunistic Expansion, and African Delusion
- Substitution Western Undervaluation, by Edifying Soft Power
  - "***Those who foolishly sought power by riding on the back of the tiger ended up inside."*** President Kennedy in his 1961 Inaugural Address

Crafting Cultural Outreach Endeavors

- The Home Front and its Founding Fundamentals
  - The Army as a Guardian of Liberty – Revolutionary, anti-Reactionary
  - Radical and Resolute for Democratic Liberty
  - Priority of Loyalty to the American Text
- The Soil, the Soldier, The National Doctrine
  - Self-Knowledge as a Context for Understanding Other Cultures
  - Seeing Yourself as Your Admirers See You and Being Emboldened by Second-Guessing and the Jealousies of Adversaries
  - The Declaration of Independence as a National Doctrine

Conclusion:

- Culture to the Soldier is a transitional tool to facilitate the effective conduct of war. To the officer, it is a tool as well as a means for interaction with officers of similar rank in other cultures. Studious reading in sociology will open doors to social groups, such as labor unions, religious groups, professional associations, and organized groups such as political parties. Political Science will assist the soldier and the officer in navigating the political and administrative/ bureaucratic sector of other societies' cultures. Anthropology will assist the soldier and the officer in interacting with villagers, village elders, women, children, youths and age cohorts.

Some reading sources:

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- **Vladimir V. Putin, "Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii o Strategii Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii" ["The Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation"],** 31 December 2015.
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- **"Azerbaijan Halqi Oz Torpaglarinin Ishgal Altinda Galmasi Ila Hech Vaxt Barishmayacag" ("Azerbaijan Will Never Agree Its Lands to Remain Under Occupation"), Ramiz Mehtiyev, Chief of the Staff of the President of Azerbaijan,** Halq Gezeti in Azerbaijani, April 6, 2016.
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- **Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber, "Putin dismisses powerful chief of staff,"** Moscow, Associate France Press, August 12, 2016.
- **"Nord Stream 2 partners withdraw amid Poland pressure,"** The Financial Times Ltd, August 12, 2016.
- **Darko Janjevic, "NATO leaders meet in Warsaw for key military summit,"** Associate Press, July 07, 2016.
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- **Thomas, Timothy L. Russia Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics. Leavenworth:** Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016. http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/EPubs/Epubs/Thomas_Russian%20Military%20Strategy_Final_(2%20May%202016).pdf.

Contact:
Program Manager
CAC CREL Management Office (CRELMO)
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2300

Ph: (913) 684-3345
DSN: 552-3345

http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/lrec